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ABSTRACT 
Objective: Data from Senegal’s baseline evaluation in 2010 from the Measurement, 
Learning, and Evaluation Project (MLE) was used to determine if religious leaders 
influence contraceptive decision-making among urban Senegalese women.  
Methods: Data was collected from a probability sample of 5,523 households. Exclusion 
criteria for analysis comprised of women who had never heard of any contraceptive 
method, were pregnant or sterile at time of interview, and women who had never had sex 
(n=5930). Reported exposure to a religious/community leader the 12 months prior to 
interview was the primary predictor variable, and current contraceptive use was the 
outcome variable. Seven multivariate logistic regression models examined this 
relationship, adjusting for both sociodemographic characteristics and religious social 
norms.  
Results: Reported exposure to a religious or community leader speaking about family 
planning (FP) in the 12 months prior to interview was significantly associated with 
contraceptive use at the time of interview. Women who heard a religious/community 
leader speak positively about FP (OR: 1.60; p<0.001) and women who heard a 
religious/community leader speak negatively about FP (OR: 1.26; p<0.05) both had 
increased odds of using contraception. These findings were not sensitive to adjustment 
for potential sociodemographic confounders and religious social norms. 
Conclusion: Greater religious and community leader involvement in FP programs could 
contribute to a better informed, engaged community where urban Senegalese women will 
be able to make reproductive decisions that are in accordance with their desired fertility. 
These findings contribute to research on the relationship between culture and health that 
are crucial for determining culturally competent, evidence-based interventions that will 
affect the health and well-being of underserved populations worldwide. 
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BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
 
Global family planning (FP) initiatives delineated in the International Conference on 
Population and Development in Cairo in 19941 and the 2012 London Summit on Family 
Planning2 may be incongruous with the cultural realities women face in societies with 
high country-level fertility desires. International reproductive health agendas focusing on 
female empowerment and joint reproductive decision-making are difficult to engender in 
places where women and couples face barriers pertaining to cultural and religious norms 
propagating high fertility, especially those with high Muslim populations.3 Senegal is a 
prime example of this type of country, struggling to strike a balance between cultural and 
religious norms and the international public health agenda to decrease fertility.  
 
In Senegal, the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in 20054 and 20105 demonstrate 
that despite widespread contraceptive familiarity and knowledge, there has been slow 
uptake of contraceptive use: in 2005, knowledge of at least one modern contraceptive 
method among married women was over 90% though only 10% used a modern method at 
the time of the survey.4 In 2010, knowledge remained high (over 90%) though modern 
contraceptive use among married women only slightly increased to 12%.5 Considering 
this disparity between awareness and use, it is clear that FP knowledge does not always 
translate to demand. In Senegal, cultural incentives for large families and de facto 
disinterest in using contraception due to the sociocultural norms constraining women’s 
autonomy6 may influence demand for FP.  
 
In Senegal’s National Family Planning Action Plan, 2012-2015, the Ministry of Health 
and Social Action set a goal to increase FP use among married women from 12% in 2010 
to 27% in 2015.7 In order to achieve this goal, planned activities include helping regions 
identify, select, and recruit religious leaders in hopes of raising awareness on the benefits 
of FP, and to expand the dimension of FP to health of the couple.7 While many other 
Muslim countries have exhibited success involving Muslim religious leaders in national 
FP programs (e.g. Turkey,8 Tunisia,9 Iran,10 Indonesia11), further examination of 
subjective norms—whether most people approve/disapprove of certain behaviors—and 
how they relate to religion in a Senegalese context could help international health 
workers determine why FP demand is so low in Senegal.   
 
Religion and Health 
 
Religion, especially Islam, is a significant cultural factor capable of influencing 
contraceptive decision-making. International trends have shown that women identifying 
as Muslim are less likely to use FP,12–18 have a higher threshold for FP acceptance,14,19,20 
have a greater desire for more children,21 and exhibit higher fertility than their non-
Muslim counterparts.16,22–24 Reasons for these trends are not entirely understood: while 
Islamic law does not explicitly state that FP is against Islam,25–27 research has shown that 
Muslims throughout the world report that they are unsure of Islam’s stance on FP.28–30 
However, despite these challenges, research supports the idea that utilizing community or 
religious leaders could proliferate FP acceptance among Muslim populations.3,19,31–39  
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Religion influences decision-making through the normalization of certain values and 
beliefs,40 therefore, religious leaders’ endorsement or disapproval of contraception is a 
relevant component contributing to behavioral intention.41 Messages expressed through 
religious leaders resonate throughout communities to “guide social and individual beliefs 
on a wide range of issues, including sexuality [and] health.”42(p634) Additionally, as an 
individual’s religiosity is strengthened, there is a stronger correlation between religious 
values and behavior,43 resulting in increased motivation to comply with referent 
individuals. These social norms indicate that religious leaders have the power to 
influence behavioral intention. Considering the vital role hierarchy and social 
organization play in knowledge exchange,44 Muslim religious leaders speaking against 
FP in Senegal could directly influence intention to use contraception among women.  
 
In Senegal, Islam plays an important role in society, though many are uncertain on 
Islam’s position regarding contraceptive use.45 Consistent with findings on the 
relationship between religiosity and behavior, Senegalese women who consider religion 
to be very important in their lives are more likely to agree that condoms are forbidden by 
religion.46 However, religious leader promotion of condom use varies depending on 
certain variables, especially marriage status; religious leaders will only promote condom 
use when it is within the context of marriage.42,43 Given the disparity between 
contraceptive knowledge and use, high religiosity, and mixed messages on Islam’s 
acceptance of FP, it is important to determine the type of influence Muslim religious 
leaders have on contraceptive decision-making in the Senegalese context.  
 
Understanding the rapport between religion, religious leaders, and the demand for FP in 
an urban environment will influence future FP programming seeking to identify best 
practices for message dissemination and utilization of referent individuals in Senegalese 
society. The primary objective of this research is to determine if exposure to religious or 
community leaders speaking publicly—whether positively or negatively—about FP 
increases the odds of contraceptive use. Examination of the circumstances under which 
women are exposed to FP messages from a religious or community leader—including the 
type of message being disseminated, the socioeconomic characteristics exhibited by the 
women, and beliefs about religious social norms—will begin to shed light on the 
relationship between religious leader propaganda and individual-level contraceptive 
decision-making.  
 
METHODS 
 
Study Setting and Design 
 
Using the 2010 baseline evaluation data collected as part of the Measurement, Learning, 
and Evaluation Project (MLE) for the evaluation of the Initiative Sénégalese de Santé 
Urbanine (ISSU), this study examined the relationship between current contraceptive use 
and reported exposure to a religious or community leader speaking publicly for or against 
FP in the 12 months prior to interview. 
 
Participants 
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The MLE baseline survey was conducted in 6 urban centers of Senegal (Dakar, Pikine, 
Guédiawaye, Mbao, Mbour, and Kaolack) and consisted of a household, men’s, and 
women’s questionnaire, as well as a facility audit, provider interview, and client exit 
interview at the facility level. Household data were collected using a two-stage sampling 
approach to obtain a representative sample of 5,523 households from six cities in urban 
Senegal. In selected households, eligible women were aged 15-49 and men were aged 15-
59. All women in selected households were interviewed individually by questionnaire, 
totaling at 9,614 women’s interviews (89% response rate). Men were interviewed in half 
of the households in four cities (Dakar, Pikine, Guédiawaye, Mbao), totaling at a sample 
of 2,270 male interviews (71% response rate).  Participants were not compensated. Only 
data from the women’s interviews were used for this analysis.47  
 
Dependent Variable 
 
The outcome variable of interest was any current contraceptive use, including both 
modern and traditional methods. Women were asked to spontaneously mention the 
contraceptive methods they were familiar with, and if they did not mention a method, the 
interviewer described the method and recorded whether or not the woman had heard of it. 
If a woman responded that she was familiar with a method, she was asked whether or not 
she has ever used that method in her lifetime. The list of methods on the questionnaire 
included male or female sterilization, contraceptive pill, intrauterine device, injectable, 
implant, male or female condom, rhythm/calendar method, withdrawal, emergency 
contraception, lactational amenorrhea, and spermicidal gel/mousse. Women also had the 
option of identifying an “other” method if it was not listed. If a woman had heard of at 
least one method, she was asked if she or her partner did anything currently to delay or 
prevent pregnancy. Women who responded yes to this question were considered to be 
current contraceptive users (1,596).  
 
Women were excluded from the sample if they had never had sex, not heard of any 
contraceptive methods, were pregnant, or unable to have children or missing. Women 
who had never used any contraceptive method (2,826) were included in the analysis as 
current non-users. Of the original 9,614 women interviewed, a total of 5,930 sexually 
experienced, fecund women were included in the sample. As the primary predictor 
variable (reported exposure to a religious or community leader speaking publicly about 
FP) is time sensitive in the exposure 12 months prior to interview, choosing contraceptive 
use at time of interview as the dependent variable implies whether reporting exposure to a 
religious or community leader speaking for or against contraception had any influence 
over current contraceptive decision-making. 
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FIGURE 1: Sample inclusion criteria 
 
 
Primary Predictor Variable 
 
The primary predictor variable was reported exposure over the 12 months prior to 
interview to a religious or community leader speaking about FP. Two questions were 
asked to gather this information: “Over the past 12 months, have you heard or seen a 
religious/community leader speak publically against FP?” and “Over the past 12 months, 
have you heard or seen a religious/community leader speak publically for FP?”  Possible 
responses were yes, no, and do not remember.  
 
One single, categorical variable was created combining these two questions to facilitate 
interpreting type of exposure reported. Categories were divided into “nothing heard”, 
“heard against only”, “heard for only”, and “heard both”. Women who heard nothing 
were coded as 0 and comprised women who reported no or do not remember to both 
questions, and women who were missing. Women who reported hearing “against” only 
were coded as 1 and confirmed exposure to a religious or community leader speaking 
publicly against FP, but not to those speaking for FP. Women who heard “for” only were 
coded as 2 and were exposed to a religious or community leader speaking publicly for 
FP, but not against FP. Women who heard “both” were coded as 3 and comprised women 
who cited exposure to religious or community leaders speaking both for and against FP. 
Women who “heard nothing” served as the referent group in multivariate analysis.  
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Religious Social Norms 
 
Questions in the survey pertaining to religion and religious leaders were examined to 
determine the relationship between FP attitudes and religious social norms. After testing 
for collinearity, five variables were examined (listed below) and four were included in the 
regression analysis: does religion influence FP decisions, should religious leaders speak 
publicly about FP, can you use FP even if your religious leader doesn’t approve, and 
religious leaders are important sources of advice on pregnancy prevention and spacing. 
Descriptive characteristics for religious social norms variables may be found in Table 2. 
 
Religious beliefs and FP decisions. Women were asked, “To what degree do 
your religious beliefs influence your FP decisions?” and had the option of selecting not at 
all, sometimes, often, or always. Responses not at all and those who did not answer this 
question served as a referent group, whereas women who responded sometimes, often, or 
always were grouped and coded as 1.  
 
Number of children is “up to God”. Women were asked their level of 
agreement (completely agree-completely disagree) after hearing the statement: “God 
alone decides the number of children a couple has.” Responses completely disagree, 
disagree and the 19 women who didn’t respond served as the referent group, and women 
responding completely agree or agree were coded as 1. This variable was included in 
descriptive statistics (Tables 2 & 3) but was not included in any logistic regression 
models due to lack of variability.  
 
Should religious leaders speak publically about FP. Women were posed the 
question, “Do you think religious leaders should speak publically about 
FP/contraception?” and had the option to respond yes, no, or unsure. Women responding 
no or unsure, along with those missing, served as the referent group to women responding 
yes. 
 
Can use FP even if religious leader doesn’t approve. Women were asked to 
identify their level of agreement with the statement, “You can use a FP method even if 
your religious leader thinks you should not use one.” Possible responses included 
completely disagree, disagree, agree, or completely agree. Women responding 
completely disagree or disagree served as the referent group to women who agree or 
completely agree.  
 
Assigned importance of religious leaders on birth spacing. Women were asked 
a series of questions on whether or not they spoke to certain individuals (e.g. mother, 
sister, friend, etc.) about birth spacing in the 12 months prior to interview. One of the 
influential persons listed was a religious leader. Women who said they spoke to a 
religious leader about birth spacing were then asked the perceived importance of advice 
received from the religious leader: “In your opinion, how important is the advice of a 
[religious leader] regarding matters pertaining to birth spacing?” Women who did not 
speak to a religious leader in the 12 months prior to interview about birth spacing were 
included in the referent group, women responding “not at all” were coded as 1, and 
women who replied “somewhat”, or “a lot” were coded as 2.   
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Sociodemographic Variables 
 
All models except the crude bivariate analysis controlled for sociodemographic 
characteristics. Variables included age (15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49), 
urban site (Dakar, Guédiawaye, Pikine, Mbao, Mbour, Kaolack), ethnicity (Wolof/Lebou, 
Poular, Serer, other), religion (Muslim, other), education (none, primary, secondary, 
secondary+), current marriage status (married / living with a man, other), and parity (0, 1, 
2, 3, 4+ children). Socioeconomic status was also included as a variable measuring 
economic well-being; household wealth was calculated reflecting the methodology used 
by the DHS,48 then was recoded into wealth quintiles (poorest, second, middle, fourth, 
richest). All sociodemographic variables are categorical and described in Table 1.  
 
Analysis  
 
Statistical analysis was performed using Stata version 12.0 (StataCorp, College Station, 
Texas). The original study population consisted of 9,614 women, and 5,930 women were 
used in the final statistical analyses after excluding women with no knowledge of 
contraception, women who were sterile, pregnant, or missing, and women who have 
never had sex. Descriptive analysis was performed adjusting for clustering and weighting 
using the svy commands. In addition, multivariable logistic regression was performed to 
examine the relationship between current contraceptive use and exposure to a religious or 
community leader speaking publicly about FP. Analysis included 7 total models, depicted 
in Table 4. The first model is a crude bivariate analysis between current contraceptive use 
and exposure to a religious or community leader speaking publicly about FP in the 12 
months prior to interview. The second model examined this same relationship while 
controlling for socioedemographic variables. Models 3-6 incorporated a single religious 
social norm variable at a time, holding sociodemographic variables constant. Finally, 
Model 7 included all religious social norms variables together while controlling for 
sociodemographic variables.  
 
RESULTS 
  
Sample Demographics 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive characteristics of the sample population. The mean age of 
the study population was 28 years (not shown), with the largest percentage (20.50%) of 
the sample aged 25-29. Women aged 15-19 accounted for the smallest percentage of the 
sample at 5.27%. As expected, all wealth groups were represented relatively evenly, with 
each quintile comprising ~20% of the study population. A large proportion of the sample 
(41.59%) was interviewed in Dakar, reflecting the true population distribution among the 
six study sites. Consistent with the proportion of women from Dakar, a majority of the 
sample claimed to be of Wolof/Lebou origin at 38.48% and, uniform with DHS findings, 
90.65% of the sample claimed to be Muslim.4,5 Two-fifths (40.08%) of the sample had no 
education at the time of interview, with proportions of the sample decreasing as level of 
education increases. Women with more than a secondary education comprised only 
4.68% of the total sample. Most women (80.62%) included in the sample was either 
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married or living with a man at time of interview, and over 85% of the population has had 
at least one child. 32.58% of women have had 4 or more children.  
 
A large majority of the study population (71.28%) did not use contraception at the time of 
interview, and weighted percentages of contraceptive use are consistent with the 
literature: women who are older, have achieved higher education, of higher 
socioeconomic status, from a larger city, non-Muslim, are currently married, and who 
have higher parity are more likely to use contraception.12,17,21,32,49,50 Among all women 
citing contraceptive use at time of interview, 22.24% came from the highest wealth 
quintile. Women from the poorest wealth quintile accounted for the smallest proportion 
of women using contraception at 17.61%. Weighted results of sociodemographic 
characteristics and contraceptive use are not displayed, but may be requested from the 
author.   
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TABLE 1:  Descriptive sociodemographic characteristics of sexually experienced fecund 
women, weighted, MLE Senegal 2011 
 
  Percent* N (Unweighted) 
Contraceptive Use     
    No Use 71.28 4,334 
    Any Use 28.72 1,596 
Age      
    15-19 5.27 296 
    20-24 16.4 1,017 
    25-29 20.5 1,238 
    30-34 18.95 1,148 
    35-39 17.26 959 
    40-44 12.66 717 
    45-49 8.96 555 
SES      
    Poorest 20.94 1,188 
    Second 20.03 1,273 
    Middle 20.01 1,389 
    Fourth 19.18 1,149 
    Richest 19.84 931 
Urban Site     
    Dakar 41.59 1,031 
    Guédiawaye 10.44 753 
    Pikine 11.73 714 
    Mbao 22.33 683 
    Mbour 6.5 1,302 
    Kaolack 7.41 1,447 
Ethnicity     
    Wolof/Lebou 36.48 2,391 
    Poular 19.56 1,257 
    Serer 17.57 1,105 
    Other 26.38 1,177 
Religion     
    Christian/None/Other 9.35 301 
    Muslim 90.65 5,629 
Education     
    No Education 40.08 2,621 
    Primary 35.84 2,133 
    Secondary 19.4 995 
    > Secondary 4.68 181 
Current Marriage Status     
    Not Married 19.38 983 
    Married/Live with man 80.62 4,947 
Parity      
    No children 14.38 756 
    One child 21.96 1,216 
    2 children 17.56 1,005 
    3 children 13.53 847 
    4 or more children 32.58 2,106 
*Weighted 
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Key Independent Variables: Religious Social Norms 
 
Most respondents included in the sample (73.26%) did not report exposure to a religious 
or community leader speaking for or against FP/contraception in the 12 months prior to 
interview (see Table 2). An equal proportion (about 10%) was exposed to a religious 
leader speaking for or against FP. About a two-thirds of women believe neither religion 
nor religious leaders influence their FP decisions. While most women still state the 
number of children a couple has is “up to god” (93.73%), only 38.42% of women cite 
that religion influences their FP decisions. Additionally, 80.56% of women believe that 
religious leaders should speak publicly about FP, though most have enough self-efficacy 
to still use FP even if religious leaders do not approve (69.86%), and 60.84% of women 
either did not speak to a religious leader about birth spacing, or do not believe they are 
important sources of advice on matters pertaining to birth spacing.  
   
TABLE 2: Descriptive religious characteristics of sexually experienced fecund women, 
weighted, MLE Senegal 2011 
 
  Percent* N (Unweighted) 
Reported hearing a religious leader speak 
about FP in previous 12 months     
    Nothing heard 73.26 4,293 
    Heard against only 11.34 704 
    Heard for only 10.34 609 
    Heard both 5.06 324 
Does religion influence FP decisions?     
    No 61.58 3,739 
    Yes 38.42 2,191 
The number of children one has is "up to 
god"     
    Disagree 6.27 429 
    Agree 93.73 5,501 
Should religious leaders speak publicly 
about FP?     
    No 19.44 1,162 
    Yes 80.56 4,768 
Can use FP even if religious leader doesn't 
approve     
    Disagree 30.14 1,673 
    Agree 69.86 4,257 
Religious leaders are important sources of 
advice on pregnancy prevention & spacing     
    Did not speak to religious leader 26.19 1,364 
    No 34.65 2,369 
    Yes 39.16 2,197 
  *Weighted 
 
On all religious social norms included, contraceptive users were significantly different 
from non-users (see Table 3). Among users, a lower percentage (67.17%) did not hear a 
religious leader speak about FP compared to nonusers (75.71%); conversely, a higher 
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percentage heard a religious leader speak for or against FP among current users. Users 
were also significantly more likely to say that religion does not influence their FP 
decisions (71.65% of users), that religious leaders should speak publicly about FP 
(85.57% of users), that they are capable of using FP even if their religious leader doesn’t 
approve (83.10% of users), and that religious leaders are not important sources of 
information on birth spacing (38.85% of users). Among nonusers, women are also 
significantly more likely to say that religion does not influence FP decisions (57.52% of 
nonusers), that religious leaders should speak publicly about FP (78.54% of nonusers), 
and that they are capable of using FP even if their religious leader doesn’t approve 
(64.52% of nonusers). However, women who are nonusers are significantly more likely 
to cite that religious leaders are important sources of information on birth spacing 
(41.45% of nonusers). Both users and nonusers overwhelmingly believe that the number 
of children one has is “up to god” (91.88% and 94.48%, respectively). Results from F-
Tests comparing the distribution of contraceptive users are displayed in Table 3 and all 
differences are significant at the p<0.05 level.  
 
TABLE 3: Religious social norms and contraceptive use among urban Senegalese 
women, weighted, MLE Senegal 2011 
 
  Contraceptive Use 
  No Use % (n=4,334) Any Use % (n=1,596) 
Reported hearing a religious leader 
speak about FP in previous 12 months**     
    Nothing heard 75.71 67.17 
    Heard against only 10.41 13.65 
    Heard for only 9.27 12.99 
    Heard both 4.61 6.19 
Does religion influence FP 
decisions?***     
    No 57.52 71.65 
    Yes 42.48 28.35 
The number of children one has is 
"up to god"*     
    Disagree 5.52 8.12 
    Agree 94.48 91.88 
Should RLs speak publicly about 
FP?*     
    No 21.46 14.43 
    Yes 78.54 85.57 
Can use FP even if RL doesn't 
approve***     
    Disagree 35.48 16.90 
    Agree 64.52 83.10 
RLs are important sources of advice 
on pregnancy prevention & 
spacing**     
    Did not speak to a religious leader 25.59 27.68 
    No 32.96 38.85 
    Yes 41.45 33.46 
TOTAL 71.28 28.72 
  *p≤ .05 
  **p≤ .01 
  ***p≤ .001 
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Multivariable Regression Results 
Model 1 
 
Regression Model 1 (Table 4) displays a crude bivariate analysis using logistic regression 
of the outcome current contraceptive use and the primary predictor variable of exposure 
to a religious or community leader speaking about FP in the 12 months prior to interview. 
Results show that exposure to a religious or community leader speaking about FP—
whether positively or negatively—is associated with higher odds of using contraception. 
Women who heard religious leaders speaking against FP had 1.26 (95% CI: 1.05-1.50) 
higher odds of using contraception compared to women who heard nothing; 1.60  (95% 
CI: 1.34-1.92) higher odds if they were exposed to religious leaders speaking in favor of 
contraception, and 1.38 (95% CI: 1.08-1.76) higher odds of using contraception if women 
were exposed to both positive and negative messages about FP in the 12 months prior to 
interview.  
 
Model 2 
  
Regression Model 2 (Table 4) is the same as Model 1, controlling for sociodemographic 
variables. Findings remained significant for women who were exposed to religious 
leaders speaking positively and negatively about FP; however, odds ratios for women 
who were exposed to both positive and negative messages were no longer significant 
(OR: 1.23, 95% CI: 0.95-1.60). Women who were exposed to religious leaders speaking 
against contraception had 1.23 (95% CI: 1.02-1.48) greater odds of using contraception, 
and women exposed to religious leaders speaking for FP had 1.41 (95% CI: 1.16-1.71) 
greater odds of using contraception compared to women who were not exposed.   
 
Model 3 
  
Regression Model 3 (Table 4) is the same as Model 2, however, a religious social norm 
variable was added: does religion influence FP decisions. Relationships between 
exposure and contraceptive use remained consistent, with greater odds of contraceptive 
use if a woman is exposed to a religious leader speaking against or for FP (OR: 1.26 
(95% CI: 1.05-1.53) and 1.36 (95% CI: 1.12-1.65), respectively). Exposure to both 
positive and negative messages about FP remained insignificant.  
  
Women who claimed that religion does influence FP decisions were significantly less 
likely to use contraception compared to women who do not believe religion influences FP 
decisions (OR: 0.61, 95% CI: 0.53-0.70).  
 
Model 4 
  
Regression Model 4 (Table 4) is the same as Model 2, adding the religious variable: 
should religious leaders speak publicly about FP. All odds ratios for exposure to a 
religious leader speaking about FP were insignificant except for women who were 
exposed to a religious leader speaking positively about FP: women had 1.33 (95% CI: 
1.10-1.62) greater odds of using contraception compared to women who heard nothing. 
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The odds of contraceptive use among women who were exposed to religious leaders 
speaking against FP was not significant. 
  
Women who believe that religious leaders should speak publicly about FP had 1.39 (95% 
CI: 1.18-1.64) the odds of using contraception compared to women who do not believe 
religious leaders should speak publicly about FP.  
 
Model 5 
  
Logistic regression for Model 5 (Table 4) is the same as Model 2, adding the religious 
social norm variable: can use FP even if religious leader doesn’t approve. Results were 
consistent with the previous models in that women exhibited higher odds of using 
contraception when exposed to either positive or negative messages about FP.  
  
Women who believe that they are able to use FP even if their religious leader doesn’t 
approve have 2.67 (95% CI: 2.27-3.14) greater odds of using contraception compared to 
women who do not cite the same self-efficacy.  
 
Model 6 
  
Model 6 (Table 4) is the same as Model 2, adding the religious social norm variable on 
whether or not religious leaders are important sources of advice regarding matters 
pertaining to birth spacing. The effect of exposure to a religious leader speaking about FP 
is consistent with the previous models.  
  
Women who believe religious leaders are important sources of advice on birth spacing 
are significantly less likely to use contraception than women who did not speak to a 
religious leaders: women assigning importance have 0.78 (0.69-0.20) the odds of using 
contraception. The odds for women who do not consider religious leaders important 
sources of information on birth spacing were not significant.  
 
Model 7 
  
All religious social norms and sociodemographic variables are included in Model 7 
(Table 4). Women exposed to negative messages and women exposed to positive 
messages about FP from a religious leader have greater odds of using contraception: 1.29 
(1.07-1.57) and 1.27 (1.04-1.55), respectively.  
  
The odds of using contraception among the religious social norm variables remained 
significant and similar in direction to the odds ratios reported in previous models, save 
the religious variable from Model 6—religious leaders are important sources of advice on 
birth spacing—which became insignificant.
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TABLE 4: Multivariate logistic regression odds ratios (95% CI) of contraceptive use among urban Senegalese women, MLE 2011 
 
  Current Contraceptive Use 
  
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6: Model 7: 
Crude OR Adjusted ORa  Adjusted ORa  Adjusted ORa  Adjusted ORa  Adjusted ORa  Adjusted ORa  
Reported hearing a religious leader 
speak about FP in previous 12 months 
              
    Nothing heard 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
    Heard against only 1.26 (1.05-1.50)* 1.23 (1.02-1.48)* 1.26 (1.05-1.53)* 1.19 (0.99-1.44) 1.31 (1.09-1.59)** 1.23 (1.02-1.48)* 1.29 (1.07-1.57)** 
    Heard for only 1.60 (1.34-1.92)*** 1.41 (1.16-1.71)*** 1.36 (1.12-1.65)** 1.33 (1.10-1.62)** 1.35 (1.11-1.64)** 1.45 (1.19-1.75)*** 1.27 (1.04-1.55)* 
    Heard both 1.38 (1.08-1.76)** 1.23 (0.95-1.60) 1.25 (0.97-1.62) 1.17 (0.91-1.52) 1.17 (0.90-1.52) 1.21 (0.93-1.56) 1.14 (0.88-1.48) 
Religious Social Norms 
Does religion influence FP decisions?               
    No - - 1 - - - 1 
    Yes - - 0.61 (0.53-0.70)*** - - - 0.70 (0.61-0.82)*** 
Should religious leaders speak publicly 
about FP?               
    No - - - 1 - - 1 
    Yes - - - 1.39 (1.18-1.64)*** - - 1.28 (1.07-1.52)** 
Can use FP even if religious leader 
doesn’t approve               
    No - - - - 1 - 1 
    Yes - - - - 2.67 (2.27-3.14)*** - 2.39 (2.02- 2.84)*** 
Religious leaders are important sources 
of advice on pregnancy prevention & 
spacing 
              
    Did not speak to a religious leader - - - - - 1 1 
    No - - - - - 1.03 (0.88-1.21) 0.96 (0.82-1.13) 
    Yes - - - - - 0.78 (0.69-0.20)** 0.93 (0.79-1.10) 
*p≤0.05 
**p≤0.01 
***p≤0.001 
a Adjusted for sociodemographic variables 
Note: P-values in columns are two-tailed tests  
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DISCUSSION  
 
We find that regardless of the type of message being disseminated, women who report 
being exposed to a religious or community leader speaking about FP have greater odds of 
using contraception compared to women who were not exposed to a religious or 
community leader speaking about FP. Women had greater odds of using contraception 
when exposed to religious leaders speaking against FP and religious leaders speaking for 
FP. These associations remained significant even after controlling for sociodemographic 
and religious social norms variables. This suggests that efforts should be made to engage 
religious and community leaders in FP programs and interventions in a way that will 
increase exposure to FP messages among the Senegalese population.  
 
Women affirming that religion influences their FP decisions, and that religious leaders 
are important sources of information on birth spacing, could indicate a higher religiosity 
and may account for the lower odds ratios in these categories. However, most women do 
not believe that religion influences their FP decisions and most believe that they can use 
FP even if their religious leader does not approve, which may indicate that despite 
Islam’s importance in the Senegalese daily life, women are still capable of exercising 
self-efficacy when it comes to reproductive health.  
 
A great strength of using MLE data is the longitudinal nature of this evaluation allows for 
future investigation of the influence of religious social norms at midterm (2013) and 
endline (2015) in order to examine if components of ISSU had any influence on women’s 
motivation to comply with religious leaders when making FP decisions. However, despite 
the fact that this dataset measuring urban data is a primary strength, it is also a limitation 
in that data collection is needed at the rural level in order to effectively determine the 
overall influence of religious and community leaders at the country-level.  
 
A primary limitation of these findings is that we are unable to determine causality: we are 
unsure if the women who reported hearing religious or community leaders speaking about 
FP were already intending to use FP before being exposed to these messages. 
Furthermore, results could be a product of recall bias, as women who use FP might be 
more likely to recall hearing FP messages from religious leaders compared to women 
who do not use FP. Additionally, we are unable to postulate why women were not 
exposed to religious or community leaders: are women not seeing religious leaders at all, 
or are they just not talking about FP? We do not know which religious leaders have been 
publicizing their opinions on FP, and whether certain religious leaders hold more 
influence than others. Lastly, using quantitative data for capturing religion and religiosity 
makes it difficult to examine the true role Islam plays in Senegal; qualitative data are 
needed to answer questions about how and why religion influences women’s family 
planning use.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the limitations of this study, we see that there is much potential for future 
research in order to better understand how Islam and referent individuals in urban 
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Senegal and elsewhere affect contraceptive decision-making. Comparing and contrasting 
data from the cross-sectional men’s sample of questionnaires will provide insight to the 
other half of the Senegalese population, and examination of perceived behavioral control, 
self-efficacy, and power differentials in couples will determine if men, women, or the 
relationship between the two accounts for such a low demand for contraception. 
Considering past and current interventions have utilized religious leaders to disseminate 
important family planning messages in hopes of increasing demand for contraception, 
understanding the relationship between religious norms and demand for contraception is 
needed through qualitative data collection and analysis to most adequately address the 
low contraceptive prevalence in Senegal.  
 
Success stories from other conservative Muslim societies demonstrate that Islam is not 
necessarily a barrier to successful FP programs,51 and religious leader involvement is a 
potential solution to address reluctance in adopting FP methods after citing religious or 
cultural concerns. In light of experiences exhibited in other Muslim countries, Senegalese 
political will with involving religious leaders in augmenting FP utilization, and MLE data 
showing the exposure to messages from religious leaders about FP is associated with 
increased odds of contraceptive use, programs that engage religious or community 
leaders may contribute to increased odds of contraceptive use among urban Senegalese 
women. However, as almost three-fourths of the study population had not been exposed 
to a religious or community leader speaking about FP in the 12 months prior to interview, 
there is much opportunity for programs to engage religious and community leaders in 
discussion on FP to increase exposure to and discussion of contraception. Greater 
religious and community leader involvement in FP programs could contribute to a better 
informed, engaged community where urban Senegalese women will be able to make 
reproductive decisions that are in accordance with their desired fertility. 
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